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Practical implementations of quantum cryptography use attenuated laser pulses as the signal
source rather than single photons. The channels used to transmit are also lossy. Here we give
a simple derivation of two beam-splitting attacks on quantum cryptographic systems using laser
pulses, either coherent or mixed states with any mean photon number. We also give a simple
derivation of a photon-number splitting attack, the most advanced, both in terms of performance
and technology required. We find bounds on the maximum disturbance for a given mean photon
number and observed channel transmission efficiency for which a secret key can be distilled. We
start by reviewing two incoherent attacks that can be used on single photon quantum cryptographic
systems. These results are then adapted to systems that use laser pulses and lossy channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography is, in theory, unbreakable [1,
2]. The laws of quantum mechanics allow a sender of a
message and a receiver, known as Alice and Bob respec-
tively, to defeat an eavesdropper, Eve, from accessing
their communications. In the first quantum cryptogra-
phy protocol discovered in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard
(BB84) [3] the idea is that Alice encodes the logical bit
values 0 and 1 on to four possible polarisation states of
a photon, two in one basis such as horizontal and verti-
cal polarisation (|x〉 and |y〉 respectively) and two in the
conjugate basis, an equal superposition of the first basis.
These photons could be encoded as having 45o and −45o
polarisation (|u〉 and |v〉 respectively). Alice randomly
sends one of them to Bob who will then measure each of
the photons in one of the two bases also randomly and
independently from Alice. After Bob has made his mea-
surement, Alice reveals on a public channel the basis in
which she sent her photon. Bob then tells her whether or
not he measured in the same basis. If he did not or he did
not detect a photon, the bit is discarded but if the same
basis was used they keep the bit and both parties should
now hold the same result of the bit’s value. The proce-
dure is repeated until Alice and Bob hold a long string
of bits. This is their sifted key and they should have
perfectly correlated bit strings. If, however, a malicious
eavesdropper, Eve, was listening in an effort to obtain
some of the key’s information, she must make measure-
ments on the states Alice sends to Bob. In doing this
she will sometimes choose the wrong measurement and
create errors in Alice and Bob’s sifted key providing a
signature of her presence to Alice and Bob when they
come to a process called error correction and estimation.
Alice and Bob sacrifice a subset of their key in order to
do this and from their estimate of the error rate they
may also calculate the maximum amount of information
an eavesdropper could have obtained, a limit bounded by
the laws of physics but as yet still unknown.
Bounds for specific attacks have been found; these are
usually attacks in which the eavesdropper measures each
individual state Alice sends to Bob known as incoherent
attacks. Incoherent attacks on the BB84 protocol usually
have the added restriction that they take into account
information gained by the eavesdropper after public an-
nouncement of the basis but before error correction and
privacy amplification. The optimal bound of an unre-
stricted attack using collective measurements of any size
is still unknown. These may not be severe limits to the
security of quantum cryptography at present because the
technology needed to perform the simplest of controlled
interactions on more than a few qubits is still at an early
stage.
In reality however, there are added complications. All
errors do not generally come from an eavesdropper alone.
There will be noise in Bob’s detectors and in the quan-
tum channel they use to setup the key as well as equip-
ment misalignments. Real implementations of quantum
cryptography also have losses during transmission and
they do not at present use single photon sources. In-
stead, attenuated laser pulses that may contain 0, 1, 2
or more photons are used as Alice’s signal source. Prac-
tical implementation of quantum cryptography opens a
security loophole and Eve may adapt her attacks to take
advantage of these facts. We give a simple derivation of
incoherent eavesdropping attacks on these imperfect sys-
tems. We give a general argument that applies equally
well to systems with high mean photon number pulses as
we make no approximation. These results apply equally
well to coherent states as to mixed photon number states
with Poissonian distribution. Three attacks are analyzed
in increasing order of technological sophistication of the
eavesdropper. This is another important point: the prac-
tical quantum cryptography system need only prevent
the most technologically powerful eavesdropper at the
time key distribution takes place. This is unlike classical
cryptography where a message may be stored until an
eavesdropper has the technology with which to break it
[1].
Provided Alice and Bob can calculate the maximum
level of information Eve could have obtained on their key
from error estimation and by making a decision on how
advanced her attack could have been in the worst case,
Alice and Bob may be still able to distill a secret key
on which Eve has negligible information using a classical
process called privacy amplification [4]. Finding these
2limits is important for the security of quantum cryptog-
raphy which could take into account the technology of
the eavesdropper and should include the settings and lim-
its of Alice and Bob’s equipment as well as fundamental
physics. We give bounds on the maximum error rate
Alice and Bob can tolerate for a realistic system with
channel losses and laser pulses as the signal source for
three incoherent attacks increasing in the technological
power of the eavesdropper.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by re-
viewing eavesdropping attacks where Alice uses a single
photon source to send key bits to Bob in section II. We
review two strategies: The simplest strategy that Eve can
employ, that of intercept-resend, a strategy whose imple-
mentation is well within the reach of current technology
to that of the optimum incoherent attack for which the
technology is not yet available. This latter attack in-
volves storing quantum states for long times and well
controlled interactions between a probe (one or more
qubits) and the state the eavesdropper is trying to iden-
tify. These strategies provide the foundations for sec-
tion III, eavesdropping on systems that use laser pulses
and have a quantum channel with a transmission effi-
ciency that may be less than unity. Beam-splitter attacks
are analyzed in detail using intercept-resend or optimal
incoherent attacks. Lastly, the photon-number splitting
attack is analyzed, the most advanced strategy an eaves-
dropper could use and relies on performing unlimited ef-
ficient quantum non-demolition measurements: technol-
ogy that is unlikely to be available for a long time. In
sections II C and III G we present some analysis on what
Alice and Bob can do to counter Eve’s attacks.
II. INCOHERENT EAVESDROPPING: SINGLE
PHOTON SOURCES
Presented here are two attacks that an eavesdropper,
Eve, can employ depending on the sophistication of her
technology on a perfect quantum cryptographic system
using the BB84 protocol. The simplest, an intercept-
resend strategy, could be implemented with equipment
currently available whereas an attack using the optimal
incoherent strategy would require an advance in technol-
ogy. The latter attack belongs to class sometimes referred
to as ‘translucent attacks with entanglement’ [5].
A. The intercept-resend strategy
The idea with this kind of attack is to measure all
or a proportion, ǫ, of the states Alice sends to Bob. If
she chooses to measure only a fraction, ǫ, of the states,
how she chooses which states to measure is dependent
on how much information she wishes to obtain on the
final message while making her presence as inconspicuous
as possible. We will not consider how she chooses this
fraction.
Presented here is an argument adapted from [7, 8]. Eve
makes her measurement on a state and given her result
she makes the best guess as to what the logical bit value
of the state was that Alice intended Bob to receive. Eve
then prepares one of the two states in the intermediate or
Breidbart basis depending on this guess and sends it on to
Bob. As we shall see, the two intermediate states belong
to the same basis in which Eve makes her measurement.
The four states Alice can send to Bob in the BB84
protocol are
|x〉 = 1√
2
(|u〉+ |v〉)
|y〉 = 1√
2
(|u〉 − |v〉)
|u〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉 + |y〉)
|v〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉 − |y〉) (1)
Eve does not have to guess the state with the best prob-
ability of being correct. Alice and Bob are trying to set
up a key composed of 1s and 0s. It does not matter what
state it is if Eve is only trying to find out the values of the
bits. Alice must encode her states as in figure 1. Note
that the logical bit values for the two states in the same
basis must be different otherwise public announcement of
the basis would result in Eve knowing everything about
the key by simply passively monitoring this public con-
versation. Eve’s best chance of guessing the value of the
bit with a simple, presently implementable measurement
is to have two outcomes M0 and M1. The probability of
guessing the bit value correctly is
Pc =
1
4
[〈x|M0|x〉+ 〈v|M0|v〉+ 〈y|M1|y〉+ 〈u|M1|u〉] (2)
Where the two measurement operators have to satisfy
M0 +M1 = I. I the identity matrix. The measurement
operators are
M0 = |0〉〈0|
M1 = |1〉〈1| (3)
The two states |0〉 and |1〉 are given by
|0〉 = cos θ|x〉 − sin θ|y〉 (4)
|1〉 = sin θ|x〉 + cos θ|y〉 (5)
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FIG. 1: The four states of the BB84 protocol represented by
their logical bit values.
Where θ is a variable angle taken clockwise from |y〉.
Substituting the forms of M0 and M1 into equation (2)
we get
Pc =
1
2
+
1
4
[cos 2θ + sin 2θ] (6)
To find the measurement basis that gives the best chance
of guessing the bit value correctly we maximize Pc with
respect to θ i.e.
dPc
dθ
= −1
2
[sin 2θ − cos 2θ] = 0 (7)
This gives tan 2θ = 1 or θ = π/8 = 22.5o. |1〉 is orthog-
onal to |0〉 and 22.5o clockwise from |y〉. This is known
as the intermediate or Breidbart basis. Substituting the
value of θ into equation (6) gives Pc = 1/2(1 + 1/
√
2).
The intermediate states, are now given by
|0〉 = cos(π/8)|x〉 − sin(π/8)|y〉 (8)
|1〉 = sin(π/8)|x〉+ cos(π/8)|y〉 (9)
We have now found the best basis in which to guess
the value of the bits Alice has encoded on to the quanta.
Alice and Bob check for Eve’s presence by measuring the
proportion of errors in their sifted key after the public
announcement of the basis. It turns out that Eve mini-
mizes the disturbance to the sifted key by recording the
value of her measurement, either M0 or M1, then send-
ing on to Bob one of two states in the measurement basis
either |0〉 or |1〉 i.e. if Alice sends |x〉 Eve will make her
measurement and get the result M0 a proportion Pc of
the time and send Bob |0〉. Eve may also get the result
M1 a proportion 1 − Pc of the time and guess the value
of the state incorrectly. In this case she sends |1〉. Eve
causes an error in Alice and Bob’s key when Bob gets the
result that |y〉 was sent. This probability, D, that Eve
causes a disturbance or error is
D = Pc〈0|My|0〉+ (1− Pc)〈1|My|1〉 (10)
WhereMy = |y〉〈y| is the outcome of Bob’s measurement.
It is sufficient to analyze only this case only without the
prior probability weightings of |x〉, |y〉 etc. being sent if
they are all equal. Equation (10) reduces to
D = 2Pc(1− Pc)
D =
1
4
(11)
If Alice and Bob see that a quarter of the bits in their
sifted key are incorrect while error checking, this is a
give away that Eve was on the line. To mask her presence
more carefully Eve can measure a proportion of the states
ǫ. In this case Eve’s probability of guessing the state
correctly is
Pc(ǫ) =
ǫ
2
(1 +
1√
2
) +
1− ǫ
2
Where the last term on the right comes from the fact that
Eve can guess with an 50/50 chance the identity of the
bit values she did not measure. The disturbance becomes
D(ǫ) =
ǫ
4
Combining these two expressions we get the probability
of Eve guessing the bit value correctly as a function of
D.
Pc(D) =
√
2D +
1
2
(12)
Note that Dmax = 1/4 as this is when ǫ = 1.
B. The optimal incoherent strategy
This strategy is reported from Fuchs et al. [9] who
proved it to be the optimum incoherent strategy an eaves-
dropper can use on an ideal quantum cryptography sys-
tem using the BB84 protocol. The derivation given here
was first given by Cirac and Gisin [10] who found a sim-
ple symmetry argument that gives the same result. This
attack is not available to an eavesdropper with present
technology.
The idea is to evolve a probe in some initial standard
state, |a〉, into distinct probe states dependant on the
state of Alice’s photon with which the probe is inter-
acted with. The probes can then be stored until Alice
4and Bob announce the basis so that Eve can increase her
chance of distinguishing the probe (and Alice’s state) by
choosing the best measurement for that particular ba-
sis. Simultaneously Eve wants to make the state she is
sending to Bob as much alike to the state Alice sent to
minimize the disturbance or error rate to the sifted key.
We have the following interactions for the x-y basis.
|a〉 ⊗ |x〉 −→ |axy00 〉 ⊗ |x〉+ |axy01 〉 ⊗ |y〉 (13)
|a〉 ⊗ |y〉 −→ |axy10 〉 ⊗ |x〉 + |axy11 〉 ⊗ |y〉 (14)
with similar interactions for the u-v basis. The second
kets in each tensor product on the right hand side after
tracing out the probe states form the mixed state Bob
will receive. The first kets in each tensor product after
tracing out Bob’s system will form the mixed state Eve
will keep. Notice that the probe states |axy,uvij 〉 are not
normalized yet. These two interactions can be written
more neatly in matrix form.
|a〉 ⊗
(|x〉
|y〉
)
−→ εxy ⊗
(|x〉
|y〉
)
(15)
Where εxy is the matrix containing the (un-normalized)
probe states. A similar expression can be constructed for
the u-v basis simply by changing subscripts. The probe
state matrices in either basis have the form
ε =
(|a00〉 |a01〉
|a10〉 |a11〉
)
(16)
Using the Hadamard transform,H , we can transform this
matrix of probe states from one basis to the other. The
transform is
εuv = HεxyH† (17)
where H is
H = H† =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(18)
Here we introduce the symmetry part of the argument.
We are going to impose the conditions that
(i) All overlaps between probe states should be invari-
ant under the change of labels 0 ←→ 1. This means
〈a10|a11〉 = 〈a01|a00〉 etc.
(ii) Overlaps between states in one basis should be
the same as overlaps in the other basis. For example
〈axy00 |axy00 〉 = 〈auv00 |auv00 〉.
Going back to equation (13) we need to normalize the
probe states and enforce the unitary evolution condition
(that overlaps should be preserved). Normalization re-
quires
〈a00|a00〉+ 〈a01|a01〉 = 1 (19)
〈a11|a11〉+ 〈a10|a10〉 = 1 (20)
From the symmetry requirement (i) and defining two pa-
rameters F and D we have
〈a00|a00〉 = 〈a11|a11〉 = F (21)
and
〈a01|a01〉 = 〈a10|a10〉 = D (22)
where F +D = 1. From the unitary condition i.e. taking
the overlaps of equations (13), (14) we have
〈a00|a10〉+ 〈a01|a11〉 = 0 (23)
and by imposing symmetry condition (i) equation (23)
becomes
〈a11|a01〉+ 〈a10|a00〉 = 0 (24)
We shall also impose that all overlaps are real numbers
i.e. 〈a00|a01〉 = 〈a01|a00〉 which you can do by careful
choices of the local phase of the states. Now because the
overlaps are real
〈a00|a10〉 = 0
〈a01|a11〉 = 0
〈a11|a01〉 = 0
〈a10|a00〉 = 0 (25)
This means all these probe states are orthogonal to one
another. We will also define some final parameters F1
and D1 that characterize the overlap of the remainder.
〈a00|a11〉 = 〈a11|a00〉 = F1 (26)
〈a10|a01〉 = 〈a01|a10〉 = D1 (27)
What we are doing is basically defining the unitary trans-
form U that we want to perform on the states. We al-
ready know the relation F +D = 1, now we need another
formula to relate the final variables F1 and D1. We can
do this from symmetry argument (ii). By transforming
the probe states in one basis to their representation in
the other basis using equation (17) then we get
F −D = F1 +D1 (28)
We can re-write equations (13) and (14) with the probe
states normalized. Normalized probe states from now on
will be denoted with a hat i.e. |aˆ〉. The normalized states
are
|a〉 ⊗ |x〉 −→
√
F |aˆxy00 〉 ⊗ |x〉+
√
D|aˆxy01 〉 ⊗ |y〉 (29)
5|a〉 ⊗ |y〉 −→
√
F |aˆxy11 〉 ⊗ |y〉+
√
D|aˆxy10 〉 ⊗ |x〉 (30)
There are similar relations for the u-v basis as well thanks
to the symmetry condition (ii), but because of this sym-
metry it is sufficient to analyze just one basis and carry
the results over to the other basis. F as it appears here is
the fidelity. Note from equations (29), (30) that these are
entangled states. Looking specifically at equation (29),
when Bob makes his measurement in the basis that Al-
ice sent the state in, the only states that will eventually
form the sifted key, he can get two outcomes. Either the
state was |x〉 which occurs with probability F in which
case the superposition will collapse and Eve’s probe state
instantaneously jumps to |aˆxy00 〉. This means Eve has got
away without causing a disturbance. The other outcome
is |y〉, an error or disturbance in Alice and Bob’s sifted
key occurring with probability D. Just because Eve got
away without causing disturbance a proportion F of the
time does not necessarily mean she will conclude cor-
rectly what the state Alice sent was. Now Eve has to dis-
criminate between two density matrices because she can
store her probes until the basis is publicly announced and
choose the best measurement to determine which density
matrix it was. Eve’s mixed states are
ρi = trBob[U(|a〉 ⊗ |i〉〈a| ⊗ 〈i|)U †] (31)
The density matrices describing Eve’s probes after the
x-y basis has been announced are
ρx = F |aˆ00〉〈aˆ00|+D|aˆ01〉〈aˆ01| (32)
ρy = F |aˆ11〉〈aˆ11|+D|aˆ10〉〈aˆ10| (33)
From equations (25) we can see the four probe states form
two orthogonal sets. One set {|aˆ10〉, |aˆ01〉} occurs with
probability D and the other set {|aˆ00〉, |aˆ11〉} occurs with
probability F . What Eve can do is devise a measure-
ment that unambiguously discriminates these two sets.
Because the measurement will also be compatible with
the sets it will not change the states of the probes. Eve
can also tell, depending on the result of this first mea-
surement, whether she has caused a disturbance to Alice
and Bob’s key. The second problem is now to discrimi-
nate between two, generally nonorthogonal states in the
same set. The basis that gives Eve the best chance of
guessing the state correctly is the intermediate or Breid-
bart basis. For two states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 the probability
of guessing the state correctly is [11]
Pc =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2 (34)
We know the overlaps between the two sets from equa-
tions (21), (22), (26) and (27). These are
〈aˆ00|aˆ11〉 = 〈aˆ11|aˆ00〉 = F1
F
(35)
〈aˆ01|aˆ10〉 = 〈aˆ10|aˆ01〉 = D1
D
(36)
So the probability of Eve guessing the correct state is
Pc = FP
F
c +DP
D
c (37)
Where PFc = 1/2 + 1/2
√
1− (F1/F )2 for example. It
actually turns out that equation (37) is maximized when
the probes in both sets have the same overlap i.e.
F1
F
=
D1
D
(38)
So PFc = P
D
c and because F + D = 1 we have the op-
timum incoherent eavesdropping strategy. Eve has the
probability to guess correctly
Pc =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− (D1
D
)2 (39)
Using the relations F + D = 1, F − D = F1 + D1 and
equation (38) we can express Pc in terms ofD only giving
Pc =
1
2
+
√
D(1−D) (40)
This strategy does much better than the intercept-resend
strategy at the cost of added technological complexity.
Griffiths and Niu [12] have proposed the quantum circuit
that does the job. This strategy can also produce deter-
ministic information on every state Alice sends to Bob at
the price of completely randomizing their sifted key. This
is a good example of the information-disturbance trade
off. Eve has a better chance of distinguishing her probe
states the smaller she makes their overlap until they be-
come orthogonal to one another and can be discriminated
perfectly. The price for decreasing the overlap between
Eve’s probes is that Bob’s density matrices become more
uniformly mixed between the wanted and the unwanted
states i.e. D increases. This comes from nature’s en-
forcement of unitary evolution, that all the overlaps must
remain the same before and after the evolution.
We know this is the optimum strategy from the deriva-
tion given by Fuchs et al. [9]. The other interesting
thing about this strategy is that can be regarded as an
asymmetrical cloning machine, taking Alice’s state and
producing two copies of unequal fidelity. One good copy
is passed on to Bob and one bad copy that is kept by
Eve. There are bounds on copying machines and the re-
sult in equation (40) can be found from work by Cerf
et al. [13]. However in the derivation presented above
the probe lives in a 4 dimensional Hilbert space, in other
words the probe consists of two qubits. Using a cloning
machine the probe need only be of 2 dimensions, a single
qubit. This has been shown by Niu and Griffiths [14].
6C. What can Alice and Bob do?
What can Alice and Bob do about this situation if
they know about both of these strategies? The condition
is that Alice and Bob can recover a secret key by one
way privacy amplification if Eve’s mutual information on
Alice or Bob’s bit string is less than the mutual informa-
tion Alice and Bob share [5, 6]. Formally this constraint
is I(A;B) ≥ max{I(E;B), I(A;E)}, where I(A;B) is
the mutual information between Alice and Bob, I(A;E)
is the mutual information between Alice and Eve and
I(E;B) is the mutual information Eve and Bob share.
We use the one way result for simplicity.
The average mutual information Alice and Bob share
on the sifted key after public announcement of the basis
in the presence of an eavesdropper is just the average
mutual information on a binary symmetric channel [15].
The disturbance, D, an eavesdropper introduces looks
like a data flipping rate to Alice and Bob.
I(A;B) = log 2 +D logD + (1−D) log(1 −D) (41)
I(A;B) can be expressed in bits by taking the logarithms
to the base 2 or nats by taking logarithms to the base e.
Equation (41) can be expressed more symmetrically in
terms of a function φ(z) [9] as
I(A;B) =
1
2
φ(1 − 2D) (42)
Where φ(z) is
φ(z) = (1 − z) log(1 − z) + (1 + z) log(1 + z) (43)
The average mutual information Alice and Eve, I(A;E),
and Eve and Bob share, I(E;B), are equal for these
strategies. The probability of the bit being flipped in
this case is just 1 − Pc. Expressed in terms of the func-
tion φ(z) this is
I(A;E) = I(E;B) =
1
2
φ[1 − 2(1− Pc)] (44)
By comparing equation (42) with equation (44) we can
find the maximum disturbance at which Alice and Bob
can expect to obtain a secret key by privacy amplification
i.e. I(A;B) > I(A;E). For a secret key to be obtained
by one way privacy amplification
D < 1− Pc (45)
For the intercept-resend strategy this is
D <
1
2(1 +
√
2)
(46)
for secret key generation to be possible and for the opti-
mal incoherent strategy
D <
2−√2
4
(47)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
D
M
ut
ua
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
(b
its
)
I(A;E) for intercept−resend attack
I(A;E) for optimal incoherent attack
I(A;B)
FIG. 2: The average mutual information as a function of the
error rate, D, for each strategy. The point at which I(A;B)
crosses with I(A;E) is the point at which Alice and Bob can
no longer distill a secret key by one way privacy amplification.
This means if the channel has a noise level greater than
this value then Alice and Bob cannot use it for quantum
key generation as they should assume all disturbance to
derive from an eavesdropper [9] if they are using one way
privacy amplification. If they detect disturbance above
this level then they must try the whole key generation
process again or give up. However, in a practical imple-
mentation of quantum cryptography this may be over-
conservative [17]. The average mutual information be-
tween Alice and Eve and Alice and Bob in bits for both
strategies is shown in figure 2.
III. INCOHERENT EAVESDROPPING: LASER
PULSES
In this section we use the results from section II to form
better strategies when the light source is a laser pulse
that can be modelled by a mixture of number states with
a Poissonian photon number distribution. All of these at-
tacks use a beam-splitter apart from the photon-number
splitting attack. In the photon-number splitting attack
an eavesdropper can make a decision on what her best
action should be because she can measure the number
of photons in the pulse non-destructively. We start by
introducing a few tools needed for this next part.
A. The beam-splitter
A beam-splitter either reflects a photon with some
probability r or it transmits it with probability t. We
are going to be dealing with lossless beam-splitters so
r + t = 1. The beam-splitter is shown in figure 3. We
can describe the action of the beam-splitter on a num-
ber state |n〉 entering through channel a and the vacuum
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FIG. 3: A beam-splitter: Photons going into channel c have
been transmitted with probability t, photons going into chan-
nel d have been reflected with probability r if all photons
arrive from channel a.
state |0〉, entering through channel b as
|n〉a ⊗ |0〉b −→
n∑
i=0
ci|i〉c ⊗ |n− i〉d (48)
The ci’s are the probability weighting for each situation.
If we take the reflection or transmission of a photon as
being independent of each other than the ci are given by
the binomial formula normalized appropriately
ci = [
(
n
i
)
tirn−i]
1
2 (49)
Where (
n
i
)
=
n!
i!(n− i)!
So the probability of detecting j photons in channel c is
|(〈j|c ⊗ 〈n− j|d)(
n∑
i=0
ci|i〉c ⊗ |n− i〉d)|2
=
n!
j!(n− j)! t
j(1− t)n−j (50)
B. Representation of laser pulses
In the ideal situation one would what to use a light
source that emits single photons on demand. Unfortu-
nately sources that emit single photon number states are
not available yet. Practical quantum cryptography usu-
ally uses an attenuated laser pulse. These pulses can be
modelled as a mixed state with a Poisson number state
distribution or as a superposition of number states with
a Poisson distribution, a coherent state. In the following
analysis we calculate values using a coherent state as the
input although strictly speaking the input state is mixed
when the logical bit values are encoded onto the polari-
sation. However, whichever input state is used gives the
same answers for the values we are interested in, those
given in section III C and onwards. The probability of de-
tecting n photons in a pulse with mean photon number
µ is given by
pn = e
−µµ
n
n!
(51)
If Alice and Bob’s quantum channel, the channel they use
for sending the states that make up the key is lossy, the
probability of detecting n photons when the pulse gets
to Bob is
pn = e
−ηµ (ηµ)
n
n!
(52)
Where η is the transmission efficiency of the channel, the
probability that each photon has of being detected by
Bob. When η = 1 the channel has no loss, all photons
in the pulse make it to Bob. When η = 0 the channel is
completely opaque.
The operation of the beam-splitter on a light pulse
entering from channel a (figure 3) looks like
∞∑
n=0
√
pn|n〉a⊗|0〉b −→
∞∑
n=0
√
pn
n∑
i=0
ci|i〉c⊗|n− i〉d (53)
The probability to find j photons in channel c is
|(
∞∑
m=0
〈j|c⊗〈m−j|d)(
∞∑
n=0
√
pn
n∑
i=0
ci|i〉c⊗|n−i〉d)|2 (54)
C. Eavesdropping attacks using a beam-splitter
We can know formulate an incoherent attack based on
beam-splitting. In a practical implementation, a laser
produces states that give the chance that multiple pho-
tons will be detected, a good scenario for an eavesdropper
trying to evade detection. All current quantum crypto-
graphic systems use these sources and this will be the
case until reliable, efficient, single photon sources become
available. Work has also been done on these attacks by
[16, 17].
The eavesdropper has positioned her beam-splitter in
Alice and Bob’s quantum channel and replaced their lossy
quantum channel with a lossless one (η = 1). The beam-
splitter is characterized by its transmission coefficient, t,
and its reflection coefficient r = 1− t. These are just the
probabilities that a photon incident on the beam-splitter
is transmitted or reflected respectively. Alice sends po-
larisation encoded Poissonian distribution mixed photon
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FIG. 4: Beam-splitter attack scenario A. The arrows in Al-
ice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s channels represent the detection of at
least one photon. The eavesdropper profits most from this
situation.
number states to Bob. These are characterized by their
mean photon number µ. We have four scenarios that
can happen during Eve’s attack labelled A, B, C and D.
These scenarios will be quoted when formulating specific
attacks later.
1. Scenario A (figure 4)
Alice has emitted a state with more than one photon
in it. At least one of these photons is reflected at the
beam-splitter and travels into Eve’s channel and at least
one photon is transmitted by the beam-splitter into Bob’s
channel. This means Eve can obtain this state for free.
She can store the photon provided she has the technol-
ogy, until Alice and Bob announce the basis publicly and
then discover the photon’s state unambiguously. In these
circumstances Eve does not cause an error on the sifted
key.
Scenario A is the ideal outcome for Eve, she cannot
be detected and she gets deterministic information pro-
vided she can store and preserve the photon or probe’s
state until public announcement of the basis. For this
scenario to occur there needs to be at least two photons
and at least one in each channel. To find the probability
for scenario A to occur this means we have to alter the
summation limits for the beam-splitter operation on the
pulse to give
PA =
∞∑
n=2
pn
n−1∑
i=1
|ci|2 (55)
We can replace the beam-splitter part, the last summa-
tion on the right by reordering i.e.
n−1∑
i=1
|ci|2 = 1− |c0|2 − |cn|2 = 1− rn − tn (56)
Putting in the explicit form of pn and making use of
r = 1− t we have
PA = e
−µ
∞∑
n=2
µn
n!
[1− (1 − t)n − tn] (57)
The remaining summation can also be dealt with using
the same trick
∞∑
n=0
xn
n!
= 1 + x+
x2
2!
+ .....+
xn
n!
= ex (58)
So with the limits in equation (57)
∞∑
n=2
xn
n!
= ex − x− 1 (59)
After some algebra PA is
PA = 1 + e
−µ − e−µt − e−µ(1−t)
= 1 + e−µ − 2e−µ2 cosh[µ(t− 1/2)] (60)
PA is maximized when t = 1/2 (i.e. cosh(x) reaches a
minimum when x = 0) but maximizing this probability
means changing the probabilities for the other scenarios
which may not be the best thing to do as Eve is trying
to make her presence as inconspicuous as possible.
2. Scenario B (figure 5)
Alice has emitted a state with one or more photons in
it. However all the photons in the state are reflected into
Eve’s channel. This is a bad situation for Eve. There
is no chance that this state will form part of Alice and
Bob’s sifted key and the second part of the bad news is
that Eve is lowering the proportion of the time Bob is
expecting to receive a click at his detectors. Bob expects
a certain proportion of the time not to receive a photon
because sometimes the pulse sent by Alice is the vacuum
state and Alice and Bob’s original channel has a trans-
mission efficiency. He will know what proportion this
should be by calculating it from the settings of Alice’s
equipment; what she has set the mean photon number,
µ, of the pulses to be by running the light through an
attenuator and by making measurements of the channel
transmission efficiency, η. This scenario reduces the pro-
portion of states sent that have at least one photon in
them from Bob’s point of view.
The probability for this occurrence is
PB =
∞∑
n=1
pn|c0|2 = e−µ
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
(1− t)n (61)
Again rearranging the summation we have
PB = e
−µt − e−µ (62)
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FIG. 5: Beam-splitter attack scenario B. The arrows in Alice’s
and Eve’s channels represent the detection of at least one
photon. Note the absence of a photon in Bob’s channel.
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FIG. 6: Beam-splitter attack scenario C. The arrows in Al-
ice’s and Bob’s channels represent the presence of at least one
photon.
3. Scenario C (figure 6)
In this scenario all photons in the pulse are transmit-
ted by the beam-splitter into Bob’s channel. This is not
as bad a situation as scenario B but it is not as good
as scenario A. The states in this scenario may go on to
form part of Alice and Bob’s sifted key and Eve does not
cause any additional reduction in the proportion of non-
empty pulses reaching Bob. Just because Eve does not
receive a photon in her channel does not mean she need
be completely ignorant of its identity. Eve could employ
one of the single photon strategies in section II at the
cost of introducing errors on Alice and Bob’s sifted key.
The probability that scenario C occurs (all photons end
up in Bob’s channel) is
Pc =
∞∑
n=1
pn|cn|2 = e−µ
∞∑
n=1
µn
n!
tn (63)
Which becomes
Pc = e
−µ(1−t) − e−µ (64)
4. Scenario D
This is a simple occurrence. This is just the situation
that the pulse Alice emits has no photon in it. It is the
vacuum state. In this case neither Alice, Bob or Eve can
get any information. The probability of zero photons in
the state is
P0 = e
−µ (65)
5. Photon number distribution after the beam-splitter
When Eve inserts a beam-splitter into Alice and Bob’s
quantum channel she alters the probability of the number
of photons Bob detects. The probability that Bob finds i
photons in his channel was given by equation (54). Writ-
ten explicitly this is
P (i) = e−µ
(µt)
i!
i ∞∑
n=i
[µ(1− t)]
(n− i)!
n−i
= e−µt
(µt)i
i!
(66)
On comparison with equation (52) we can see that the
addition of the beam-splitter does not change the overall
shape of the photon number distribution; it is still Pois-
sonian (although with a smaller average number of pho-
tons). If Eve then replaces Alice and Bob’s lossy chan-
nel described by η with one that is lossless (η = 1) she
can then choose the transmission coefficient of the beam-
splitter, t to match η (η = t). In this way Eve does not
cause any change the photon statistics Bob expects.
D. Intercept-resend attack with a beam-splitter
A strategy like this could be implemented with today’s
technology. This section borrows the main results from
section IIA and section III C.
This is what Eve does: If she gets photons in her chan-
nel she measures them in every instance that the situa-
tion occurs. When scenario A occurs, only the photons
in Bob’s channel will be subject to error checking so she
will not cause any errors on the sifted key. Borrowing the
main result from section II A Eve’s probability of guess-
ing the state correctly from scenario A alone is
P i−r(D =
1
4
) =
√
2 + 2
4
(67)
The overall probability that Eve guesses the correct state
when scenario A occurs is
P correctA =
PAP
i−r(D = 1/4)
1− P0 − PB (68)
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The denominator in the equation above appears because
we only include those situations in which the states have
the opportunity to form part of Alice and Bob’s sifted
key. It is like a normalizing factor. Eve may get more
than one photon in her channel when scenario A occurs.
If she then measures them in the intermediate basis she
may get both measurement results M0 and M1. What
should Eve conclude now? We make an approximation
here and say that Eve always gets a single result. To
give some justification of this if Eve has a detector that
can measure the number of photons incident on it but de-
stroys the photons in the process then when Eve analyzes
more than one photon she can be reasonably certain that
the bit value sent was the one that resulted in the higher
number of photon detections for a that outcome. The
only time Eve must make a 50/50 guess is when there are
the same number of detected photon for each measure-
ment outcome. However, more than one photon detected
for only one outcome will give Eve a higher probability
of guessing the state correctly so we think this is not a
bad approximation.
The second part of the strategy is that when Eve does
not get a photon in her channel she measures a propor-
tion, ǫ, of the photons that make it into Bob’s channel.
She only does this a proportion of the time to control the
level of disturbance she inflicts on Alice and Bob’s sifted
key. The disturbance, DAB, that Alice and Bob see in
their sifted key is going to be different from the D ap-
pearing in the single photon strategies because they only
see this disturbance on a proportion of the bits, those
that came from scenario C namely
ǫPc
1− P0 − PB (69)
Therefore the disturbance Alice and Bob see is
DAB(ǫ) =
D(ǫ)PC
1− P0 − PB (70)
The probability of guessing the state correctly from sce-
nario C is given by
P correctC (D) =
P i−r(D)PC
1− P0 − PB (71)
Where (borrowed from section IIA)
P i−r(D) =
√
2D +
1
2
(72)
So the total probability of guessing the state correctly is
P correcttot =
PAP
i−r(D = 1/4) + PCP
i−r(D)
1− P0 − PB (73)
The probabilities of each of the scenarios is dependant on
the transmission coefficient of the beam-splitter, t. From
section III C it was found that if Alice and Bob are ex-
pecting to see a line with loss η then Eve can replace it
with a lossless one and make her beam-splitter transmis-
sion be t = η to give the same photon number statistics
Bob expects. Now what Eve has to do to avoid Alice and
Bob’s suspicions is fix the value of t to the value of η as
well as lowering the error rate Alice and Bob see, DAB.
Giving the explicit form of equation 73 we have
P correcttot =
√
2 + 2
4
− e−µ(1−t)[
√
2(1/4−D)] (74)
The disturbance Alice and Bob see (the error rate in their
sifted keys) is
DAB = De
−µ(1−t) (75)
With equation (75) Eve can control the error rate and
by knowing η she can then calculate how likely she is to
guess the correct values of the bits using equation (74).
E. Optimal incoherent attack with a beam-splitter
This attack is similar to the last one considered except
now the eavesdropper has better technology and can use
the strategy reported in section II B and extract more in-
formation for a fixed disturbance. When scenario A oc-
curs this time, Eve can perform an interaction between
the probe and the photon in her channel to maximize the
disturbance to the photon’s state and maximize the dis-
tinguishability of the probe. She can then store the probe
and wait until the basis is announced before measuring
it. Now she can unambiguously determine which state
Alice sent to Bob. When scenario C occurs the eaves-
dropper reverts to the single photon strategy and again
Alice and Bob will notice a smaller average disturbance
DAB then D because this situation does not occur all the
time. Eve again should set η = t to give Bob the same
photon statistics and DAB will be given by equation (75).
So scenario A occurs. The eavesdropper has a proba-
bility of being correct from this circumstance that is
P correctA =
PA
1− P0 − PB (76)
There is no additional multiplier because Eve gains de-
terministic information i.e. P opt(D = 0.5) = 1.
Scenario C occurs giving a probability of being correct
P correctC =
PCP
opt(D)
1− P0 − PB (77)
P opt(D) is the probability of guessing the state correctly
taken from section II B and is as a reminder
P opt(D) =
1
2
+
√
D(1−D) (78)
The total probability that Eve guesses the correct state
is
P correcttot =
PA + PCP
opt(D)
1− P0 − PB (79)
11
The total probability of Eve guessing the state correctly
given explicitly is
P correcttot = 1− e−µ(1−t)[1/2−
√
D(1−D)] (80)
F. Photon-number splitting attack
What an eavesdropper can do here is perform unlim-
ited numbers of quantum non-demolition (QND) mea-
surements with unit efficiency. QND measurements are
measurements that give the value of one observable with-
out effecting the other degrees of freedom. The QND
measurement Eve is interested in is one which tells her
the number of photons in the laser pulse without effecting
their polarisation. These measurements are very difficult
to perform, the first demonstration being by Nogues et
al. [18]. This eavesdropping attack is far beyond present
technology. Work on these kinds of attack has also been
done by [19, 20]. The flip side is that if Alice has the
technology to perform QND measurements then she can
simply stop any pulse that has more than one photon in
it before sending it to Bob. In this case an eavesdropper
will have revert to the strategies given in section II. We
will here analyze the case of the more advanced eaves-
dropper.
Using this attack Eve can discover the number of pho-
tons in the pulse and then choose her actions accordingly.
If there is more than one photon in the pulse she just
splits off a single photon and lets the others pass to Bob.
She can then perform an interaction with her probe and
store it until the basis is announced then make a mea-
surement that will give her the correct value every time.
If there is more than one photon in the pulse then Eve
does not cause an error on Alice and Bob’s sifted key. If
she sees only one photon then she performs the optimal
incoherent attack at the cost of adding some disturbance.
If Alice and Bob have a lossy channel with some trans-
mission efficiency η, Eve can replace this channel with
a lossless one then selectively block the single photon
pulses to give the same proportion of non-empty pulses
Bob is expecting. In this way Eve may even be able to
obtain deterministic knowledge of Alice and Bob’s sifted
key without causing any errors depending on the values
of the original channel transmission efficiency η and the
mean photon number µ.
From equation (51) the probability that Alice sends a
pulse containing zero and one photons are
P0 = e
−µ (81)
P1 = µe
−µ (82)
And the probability for detecting more than one photon
is
Pn>1 = 1− e−µ(1 + µ) (83)
If Eve blocks a proportion κ of the pulses containing one
photon then her probability of guessing the state cor-
rectly is
P correcttot (D) =
Pn>1 + (1− κ)P1P opt(D)
1− P0 − κP1 (84)
The denominator is again there to exclude the circum-
stances that Alice and Bob (and Eve in this case) do not
use, all the empty pulses. The probability of Eve guessing
the state correctly is given explicitly as
P correcttot (D) =
1− e−µ(1 + µ) + (1− κ)µe−µ[1/2 +
√
D(1−D)]
1− e−µ(1 + µκ) (85)
The disturbance Alice and Bob see when Eve uses this
strategy is
DAB =
(1− κ)P1
1− P0 − κP1D
=
(1− κ)µe−µ
1− e−µ(1 + µκ)D (86)
If Alice and Bob’s quantum channel has transmission ef-
ficiency η, Eve can block a proportion, κ, of the one pho-
ton pulses if she replaces Alice and Bob’s channel with a
lossless one (η = 1). We can equate the number of non-
empty pulses Bob expects to see with a lossy channel
to the number of non-empty pulses after Eve selectively
blocks the single photon pulses.
1− e−ηµ = (1− κ)P1 + Pn>1 (87)
This gives κ as
κ =
1
µ
[eµ(1−η) − 1] (88)
When κ = 1 Eve has deterministic knowledge of the
whole of Alice and Bob’s key without causing any er-
rors in it. Lossy lines and high mean photon numbers
are therefore a huge security risk under this attack. The
value of η as a function of the mean photon number, µ,
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this occurs at is given by
η = 1− 1
µ
ln(1 + µ) (89)
G. What can Alice and Bob do?
If Alice and Bob are trying quantum key distribution
with attenuated laser pulses instead of a single photon
source what measures can they take to ensure that Eve
does not obtain their key? The first thing Alice and
Bob can do is check the error rate in their keys. Using
the same criteria as in section II C for one way privacy
amplification to be successful then
DAB < 1− P correcttot
If Eve is using the intercept-resend strategy presented
here Alice and Bob must detect a lower disturbance than
DAB <
2−√2(1 − e−µ(1−η))
4(1 +
√
2)
(90)
to be able to distill a secret key. If Eve is using the
optimal incoherent attack then
DAB < (
2−√2
4
)e−µ(1−η) (91)
And finally if Eve is using the photon-number splitting
attack then
DAB < (
2−√2
4
)[
(1 + µ)e−µ − e−ηµ
1− e−ηµ ] (92)
The average mutual information as a function of DAB,
the error rate in Alice and Bob’s sifted key is plotted for
each of these strategies in figure 7 for η = 0.9 and µ = 1.
Apart from measuring the disturbance or error rate in
their keys, Alice and Bob can also monitor coincidence
counts [17]. Bob can count the number of times both of
his detectors click when he chooses the wrong basis i.e.
he gets both results from his measurement. These oc-
currences come from multiple photons in the laser pulse.
Bob knows the mean photon number of the pulses Alice
is sending and the transmission efficiency of their channel
so he can work out how often this should occur. This is
what he can do to monitor the photon number distribu-
tion if he does not have a detector that can discriminate
the number of photons incident on his detector. Bob
expects
Pcoincidence =
1
2
e−ηµ
∞∑
n=2
(ηµ)n
n!
n−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
2−n (93)
Pcoincidence =
1
2
(1 + e−ηµ − 2e−ηµ2 ) (94)
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FIG. 7: The average mutual information as a function of the
error rate, DAB , for each strategy at a fixed η = 0.9 and
µ = 1. The point at which I(A;B) crosses with I(A;E) is the
point at which Alice and Bob can no longer distill a secret
key by one way privacy amplification.
The 2−n term on the right hand side of equation (93)
is because when Bob uses the wrong basis he effectively
has a 50/50 beam-splitter and the 1/2 factor comes from
the fact that Bob chooses the wrong basis half the time.
Eve will not effect the photon number distribution that
Bob sees in the beam-splitting attacks providing she has
set the beam-splitter transmission to equal the transmis-
sion efficiency, η, of their original lossy quantum channel
as shown in section III C. The photon number distribu-
tion is still Poissonian. However, with the more powerful
QND attack which is dependant on the number of pho-
tons in the pulse the photon number statistics Bob sees
will no longer be Poissonian. In the strategy above we
fixed the number of non-empty pulses to be equivalent
to Bob’s expectations. In doing this though we have re-
duced the probability of Bob finding a pulse containing
more than one photon which Bob can detect from the re-
duction in the proportion of coincidence counts. A more
detailed analysis of this is given by Fe´lix et al. [17] and
Lu¨tkenhaus and Jahma [21].
IV. CONCLUSION
We have given a simple derivation of beam-splitting
and photon-number splitting attacks on the BB84 pro-
tocol in a realistic implementation: that of using a laser
pulse to send signals instead of the ideal single photon
source and of using a channel that is lossy. From these
results we found a bound on the maximum disturbance
or error rate Alice and Bob can accept in their sifted
keys to successfully complete privacy amplification and
give Eve an insignificant amount of knowledge of the key
once this process is complete. These results make no
approximation of small mean photon number.
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There is now a large amount of research on eavesdrop-
ping on quantum cryptography. These works have largely
neglected analyzing the EPR based protocols, the first
given by Ekert in 1991 [22]. We think it would be in-
teresting to look at eavesdropping strategies on realistic
implementations of these protocols.
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